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Abstract
An important aspect of making good decisions is the ability to adapt to changes in the values of available choice options, and
research suggests that we are poor at changing behavior and adapting our choices successfully. The current paper contributes
to clarifying the role of memory on learning and successful adaptation to changing decision environments. We test two
aspects of changing decision environments: the direction of change and the type of feedback. The direction of change refers
to how options become more or less rewarding compared to other options, over time. Feedback refers to whether full or
partial information about decision outcomes is received. Results from behavioral experiments revealed a robust effect of the
direction of change: risk that becomes more rewarding over time is harder to detect than risk that becomes less rewarding
over time; even with full feedback. We rely on three distinct computational models to interpret the role of memory on
learning and adaptation. The distributions of individual model parameters were analyzed in relation to participants’ ability to
successfully adapt to the changing conditions of the various decision environments. Consistent across the three models and
two distinct data sets, results revealed the importance of recency as an individual memory component for choice adaptation.
Individuals relying more on recent experiences were more successful at adapting to change, regardless of its direction. We
explain the value and limitations of these findings as well as opportunities for future research.
Keywords Dynamic decision making · Risky choice · Change detection and adaptation · Instance-based learning ·
Memory processes · Reinforcement learning

Introduction
Most choices made at the organizational and personal levels,
under risk or uncertainty, are encountered in changing
environmental conditions. For example, new technological
advancements may increase or reduce the demand for an
organization’s products or services. A decade ago, online
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shopping may have been less attractive and indeed less
optimal than visiting a store, given high shipping and
other associated costs. This situation has gradually changed:
shipping costs have decreased, technology has advanced,
and, because of convenience, online shopping has become
more attractive compared to shopping at stores, changing
the relative value of the alternatives over time. In this, as
well as in many other examples, it is important to become
aware of the change in the value of the available options to
adapt our choices and maximize benefits.
To adapt our choices to changes in naturalistic settings,
we often infer the dynamic changes of a situation from the
decisions we make and the experienced outcomes, and rely
less on descriptions of the pros and cons of each alternative
(Gonzalez, 2017; Gonzalez et al., 2017). Experience often
takes priority over having a description of the attributes
of available choice options, and research suggests that
descriptions (e.g., payoffs and associated probabilities) end
up being ignored altogether or discounted when making
repeated risky choices (Lejarraga & Gonzalez, 2011; WeissCohen et al., 2016; but see Weiss-Cohen et al., 2018;
Weiss-Cohen et al., 2021).
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However, with heavy reliance on experience, the
direction in which available options change over time
and the actual individual experiences can influence the
way people adapt their choices. In the shopping example
above, the experience of online shopping has become more
positive over time, e.g., with advancements in technology
and easiness of use. An early adopter may have experienced
negative outcomes such as long delivery times and product
returns, and reconsidered store shopping, while a late
adopter may have had more positive experiences with online
shopping and been more likely to avoid store shopping in
the future.
In this research, we investigate how personal experience,
the direction in which available choice options change
(i.e., increasing or decreasing in value), and the availability
of information (i.e., full or partial feedback about choice
options) influence how people adapt their choices in
changing decision environments. To shed light on these
effects, we turn to a long-standing line of research:
experience-based choice between risky monetary gambles
(see e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004).
The decisions from experience (henceforth, DfE) literature
has accumulated valuable evidence for explaining and
predicting choice behavior over time, in situations in which
people learn the outcomes and their associated probabilities
from feedback received after selecting available choice
options (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In particular, as we
will describe below, recent investigations on adaptation to
change in experiential choice (e.g., Avrahami et al., 2016;
Kareev et al., 2014; McCormick et al., 2020) have shown
that people find it hard to detect and adapt to change.
Research findings point to stickiness and primacy, (i.e.,
over-reliance on initial experiences; similar to the “hot
stove” effect, see Denrell and March, 2001) and to recency
(i.e., over-reliance on most recent experiences), as potential
mechanisms involved in the detection of and adaptation to
change.

Memory and adaptation to change in experiential
choice tasks
Unlike description-based choice tasks where information
about choice alternatives (i.e., outcomes and associated
probabilities) is explicitly provided to participants (e.g., a
choice between Option A: $100 with certainty; and Option
B: $200 with 50% chance, or 0 otherwise), in experiential
choice tasks, participants learn (or infer) the value and
frequency (i.e., probability) of outcomes from available
options by repeatedly choosing among them and observing
their outcomes via feedback. The majority of research on
risky experiential choice has investigated choice behavior
in decision environments where choice options remain
unchanged throughout the course of the task (see Erev et al.,
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2010; Hertwig et al., 2004; Wulff et al., 2018); using the
options from the above example in a static experiential
choice task, selecting Option B would return either $100
or $0 with constant 50-50 probabilities. However, change
constitutes a fundamental feature of the real world, and thus
exploring behavior in dynamic experiential choice tasks
(where outcomes and/or probabilities change from trial to
trial) can extend our understanding of decision making
in more naturalistic settings (e.g., Navarro et al., 2016;
Weiss-Cohen et al., 2021).
Rakow and Miler (2009) conducted one of the few initial
studies that manipulated the way the relative value of choice
options changes over time. In a choice task between one
dynamic and one static option, the authors investigated
how people behaved when static and dynamic options
changed their relative expected value during multiple
repeated choices. In some environments, the probability
of receiving a high outcome from the dynamic option
changed from stable to increasing to stable again. This
pattern made the dynamic option less favorable than the
static option at the early stages of the task, but more
favorable later on. Other decision problems involved the
reverse pattern of change in the probabilities, from stable
to decreasing to stable again, making the dynamic option
more favorable than the static option at the early stages of
the task and reversing its relative advantage later on. Two
interesting, albeit inconclusive, observations emerged from
their findings: (1) initial experiences impact later choices
and inhibit adaptation to the change in probabilities (i.e.,
a stickiness effect); and (2) individuals seem to respond
differently to improvements in a less favorable option than
decrements in a more favorable one in the presence of
full feedback (i.e., a direction-of-change effect). Although
stickiness and direction-of-change may be useful to explain
the slow adaptation observed in their findings, the authors
called for more research to understand how these effects
emerge from memory processes and how to design decision
environments (i.e., manipulate the direction of change) in
ways that adaptation can be predicted.
Recent studies have corroborated and extended the initial
results from Rakow and Miler (2009). Avrahami and Kareev
(2011) suggested that recent rather than earlier experiences
are the best and persistent predictors of later choices. They
also suggested that inertia (e.g., Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012;
Erev & Haruvy, 2005) - a tendency to repeat previous
actions (which is a form of stickiness) - is partly responsible
for the predictive power of recency. It is also claimed that
memory is necessary to hold the sequential patterns of
observations from a decision environment and to monitor
the relative value of options over time (Ashby & Rakow,
2014; Rakow & Miler, 2009). However, some common
sequential regularities found in static experience-based
choice tasks do not appear to emerge in dynamic tasks with
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changing probabilities (see Biele et al., 2009). Following
this, it is reasonable to argue that memory or learning may
play a different role in dynamic tasks, and thus, research on
their role in such changing environments is necessary.
Theories and models of DfE suggest that choice behavior
is determined by well-known aspects of human memory:
forgetfulness, confusion of experiences, distortion of the
actual probability with which outcomes occur, and overreliance on experiences from our recent past (Gonzalez
et al., 2003; Gonzalez, 2013). In stable environments, higher
memory capacity should facilitate the selection of better
choice options, because future selections can rely on a
larger set of past experiences. Indeed, studies in experiential
decision-making have found that higher memory capacity
and cognitive resources are good predictors of better
performance in static environments (e.g., Fiedler, 2000;
Frey et al., 2015; Rakow et al., 2010). Rakow et al.
(2008) observed that the amount of exploration devoted to
each alternative (that is, choosing and alternating between
options to learn more about their value) was positively
correlated with working memory capacity, suggesting that
participants would search for more information and are
expected to make better choices when they have better
memory.
Furthermore, recent research also suggests that memory
is important for adaptation to dynamic tasks. Lejarraga et al.
(2014) supported Rakow and Miler’s (2009) observations
by comparing the predictions from an Instance-Based
Learning model (IBL; Lejarraga et al., 2012) to observed
human choices. Their study compared individual and group
adaptation to changing conditions in a dynamic choice task.
Using binary-choice experiential tasks similar to those in
Rakow & Miler, they found that groups performed better
than the average individual in stable conditions of the task,
but groups were unable to adapt as well as individuals did
after a sudden change in the choice environment. Their
explanation was that better memory found in groups can
actually be detrimental to adaptation of choices in dynamic
conditions. This observation suggests that in dynamic
environments, strong memory (i.e., reliance on a large set
of past observations) may be unnecessary, because future
selections may be best informed by more recent experiences
(i.e., small samples; Lejarraga et al., 2014; Rakow & Miler,
2009). Studies in DfE have argued that reliance on small
samples makes detection of change in the environment
easier, and that relying on less information is more
advantageous than relying on more samples (Hertwig &
Pleskac, 2010). While this intuition seems correct, reliance
on recent small samples cannot be entirely attributed to
limitations of human memory, but also to the stochasticity
of the environment (see Rakow et al., 2008).
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In the current work, we use a binary choice task to
investigate the effects of the direction of change and the
type of feedback (full and partial) on participant’s ability
to adapt to change. Participants choose repeatedly between
a safe option which remains unchanged throughout the
task, and a dynamic option which either decreases or
increases in expected value across time (through changes in
the probability of receiving a high outcome). Participants
receive one of two types of feedback: feedback only from
the option they select (i.e., partial feedback) or feedback
from both the selected and unselected options (i.e., full
feedback.
The use of full and partial feedback as an experimental
condition is motivated by the limited research on feedback
effects in dynamic choice tasks, and by the fact that
feedback may be directly linked to the observability of
change itself (Avrahami et al., 2016). For example, partial
feedback may create a potential asymmetry between the two
options and confound the effects of the direction of change.
The availability of full feedback suggests that participants
will have complete information on the outcomes of
both options, while receiving partial feedback will not
provide such information unless participants actively select
and explore both options. Investigating the direction of
change with full and partial feedback would help rule out
information asymmetry as a potential confounding factor
and test whether any direction-of-change effects are due
to environmental situational regularities (e.g., information
availability) or genuine characterizations of the decision
process (see e.g., Plonsky & Erev, 2017).
To provide a better characterization of the observed
behavioral effects and how learning and memory play out
in strategies for choice adaptation, we used two distinct
computational modeling approaches. The first approach,
Instance-Based Learning (IBL), relies on representations
of memory mechanisms such as frequency and recency
of events to explain decision making in dynamic tasks.
Such memory mechanisms, informed by Instance-Based
Learning Theory and the well-known cognitive architecture
of ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Gonzalez et al.,
2003), explain how decisions from experience depend on
memory processes: memory decays over time and the
probabilities of events are determined by the frequency of
experienced events and are partially stochastic. The IBL
model has been used widely in binary choice to replicate
human decision making (Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; Lejarraga
et al., 2012).
The second approach we applied in the current setting
is reinforcement learning (RL). Specifically, we used two
instantiations (or classes) of model-free RL models (e.g.,
Sutton & Barto, 1998) which have been extensively used
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in experience-based decision-making tasks (Yechiam &
Busemeyer, 2005). The first instantiation assumes a delta
rule to update/learn the relative values of each option (see
e.g., Busemeyer & Myung, 1992); the second instantiation
resembles that of IBL, as it assumes that memory decays
as a function of time (hence the values of unchosen
options are discounted over time). Crucially, the two
modelling approaches assume different learning and choice
mechanisms: while RL models assume a trial-by-trial value
updating process for each option, the IBL model resembles
exemplar-based processes with probabilistic retrieval of the
relevant instances/exemplars from memory.
We estimate the parameters of the IBL and RL models
at the individual level. This procedure allows us to
categorize participants based on their best fitting memory
and learning parameters, and relate these parameters to
their ability to adapt to the changing environments. The
patterns in the individual parameters across two distinct
modelling approaches allow us to provide descriptions of
the experimental results and make inferences regarding the
general role of memory in adaptation to dynamic tasks.

Experiment: Adaptation to gradual change
in a binary choice task
Participants
We tested a total of 525 participants (Mage = 34.60,
SDage = 11.69; 170 Female), recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. They were compensated with both a

Task and design
The experimental design was a 2 (Type of Feedback)
x 3 (Direction of change) between-subjects experiment.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 6
conditions to perform a two-option consequential choice
task for 100 trials.
The two options were presented in the middle of the
screen as two unlabeled buttons set side by side on the right
and left of the screen. One option was safe and produced
a 250 point outcome each time it was selected (i.e., p =
1). The second option was risky and had two possible
payoffs: 0 or 500 points. The probability of receiving the
500 point payoff after selecting the risky option was varied
by the direction-of-change condition (Static, Increasing, and
Decreasing); and the probability of receiving 0 points for the
risky option was the complement. The safe and risky options
were randomly assigned to the right or left screen buttons
and remained in the same position for the duration of the 100
trials. Also, there were two experimental conditions about
whether participants received forgone outcome feedback
(Full; feedback about both, the outcome of the selected
option and the outcome of the unselected option) or not
(Partial; feedback only on the outcome of the selected
option).
Figure 1 (straight lines shown in the Risky panel)
illustrates the probability of the high outcome (500 points)

Static

Increasing

Decreasing

1.00
0.75
Risky

Proportion

0.50
0.25
0.00
1.00
0.75

Partial

0.50

Full

0.25
Safe

0.00
0

25 50 75 100 0

Risky

25 50 75 100 0

Trial

Risky

Safe

Maximization

Fig. 1 Risky Row: Average
proportion of choices from the
risky option across trials,
direction of change (Static,
Increasing, and Decreasing) and
feedback presentation (Partial
and Full) conditions. Yellow
solid lines show the probability
of receiving the high outcome
(500 points) in the risky option.
Maximization Row: Average
maximization rates across trials
and experimental conditions.
Labels in the figure (Safe,
Risky) indicate the maximizing
option before and after trial 50
(turning point)

standard participation fee ($0.50) and an additional payment
based on their performance on the task (mean bonus
payment = $0.26).

25 50 75 100
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in the risky option over the course of 100 trials in each
of the three direction-of-change conditions. In the Static
probability condition (Partial: N = 72; Full: N = 92),
the probability of receiving 500 points from the risky
option was .50 throughout the 100 trials. In the Increasing
probability condition (Partial: N = 54; Full: N =
91), the probability of receiving the 500 point outcome
began at .01 and increased by .01 on each trial until
the final trial where the probability was 1. Finally, in
the Decreasing probability condition (Partial: N = 78;
Full: N = 91), the probability of receiving 500 points
began at 1 and decreased by .01 on every trial. The two
options (safe and risky) in each condition are equivalent
in terms of the overall (across all 100 trials) Expected
Value (EV): EV(safe)= 250 and EV(risky)= .50 × 500 =
250. However, during the first 50 trials (trials 1 to 49)
the risky option is advantageous (i.e., EV maximizing)
in the decreasing condition and disadvantageous in the
increasing condition. On trial 50 (i.e., the “turning” point),
the probability of receiving the high outcome is exactly .50
in all conditions; and following trial 50 (trials 51 to 100) the
risky option is disadvantageous in the decreasing condition
and advantageous in the increasing condition.

Procedure
After providing consent and answering demographic
questions, participants were given instructions about the
task. They were randomly assigned to one of the 6
experimental conditions. The risky and safe options
were presented as unlabeled buttons, with their position
randomised on the right or left side of the screen. On each
trial, participants were asked to select one of the two buttons
and were provided with immediate feedback (Partial or
Full).
Upon completion of the task, participants filled out a
funnel debriefing (see Appendix), designed to ascertain
their knowledge of changes in the underlying probabilities
of the task. The funnel debriefing asked participants to
describe the two choice options, whether they thought one
option was better than the other (i.e., it gave the most points
on average), and whether they thought one option was better
at one point in the game and worse at another point in the
game. If participants reported that one option changed, they
were then asked whether the target option was better at the
beginning or the end of the game, and also asked to indicate
on a 0-100 trial sliding scale at which point they thought the
option became better (or worse).
Datasets, analysis and modeling scripts are available
online on the Open Science Framework (OSF) website:
https://osf.io/4swfx/.

Results
Figure 1 (Risky row) plots the average proportion of choices
for the risky option across the 3 (direction of change :
Static, Increasing, Decreasing) × 2 (feedback presentation:
Partial, Full) between-subjects experimental conditions1 .
Risky rates were analyzed using a generalized logit mixedeffects model with time (blocks of 20 trials), direction
of change and feedback presentation as fixed effects,
and random intercepts for each participant2 . The analysis
revealed a significant main effect of the direction of change,
χ 2 (1) = 89.64, p < .001, with risky rates being higher in
the decreasing (M = 0.55) than the increasing condition
(M = 0.35). The main effect of feedback presentation was
also significant, χ 2 (1) = 4.98, p = .026 (MPartial = 0.44,
MFull = 0.47), but it did not interact with direction of
change, χ 2 (1) = 1.35, p = .25. The main effect of block
was significant, χ 2 (4) = 51.41, p < .001, as well as
all 2-way and 3-way interactions with direction of change
and feedback presentation (all ps < .001). These results
indicate that participants were sensitive to the change in the
underlying probabilities of the risky option and exhibited
distinct choice patterns across experimental conditions.
Specifically, in the decreasing condition, participants
took only a few trials before they started to select the
risky option at a frequency that appears to match the
probability of receiving the higher outcome from the risky
option (see top-right panel in Fig. 1A). Probability matching
(see e.g., Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008, Shanks et al.,
2002) has mostly been observed in DfE studies with static
probabilities (e.g., Erev & Barron, 2005), but also in
dynamic DfE tasks (e.g., Rakow & Miler, 2009). Choice
in the increasing condition is not indicative of probability
matching. Participants seem to “stick” longer with the safe
option even after the turning point (trial 50 onwards), after
which selecting the risky option becomes objectively more
advantageous. This is the case regardless of whether they
received information about the outcome of the unselected
option (Full feedback condition).
In the Static condition participants showed an emerging
preference for the safe option. However, there were more
selections from the risky option in the full feedback group
(MFull = 0.44 vs MPartial = 0.38), which is consistent with
findings of increased risk taking in the presence of foregone

1 We

excluded 47 participants from further analyses as they chose one
option more than 95 out of the 100 trials, which is an indication of
extreme lack of exploration (and motivation) to allow for the detection
of the change in the choice options.
2 The analysis did not include the Static condition as the main focus of
the present work is the changing probability conditions.
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payoffs (e.g., Erev & Barron, 2005; Weiss-Cohen et al.,
2021; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005).
We performed similar analyses on the maximization
rates (Fig. 1, Maximization row) using direction of change,
feedback presentation, and time period (two levels; before
and after trial 50, the turning point) as fixed effects,
and participant-specific random intercepts. The analysis
showed a significant main effect of direction of change,
χ 2 (1) = 6.81, p = .009, with participants in the decreasing
condition selecting more often the maximizing option than
participants in the increasing condition (MDecreasing = 0.69
vs MIncreasing = 0.64). Feedback presentation was also
significant, leading to higher maximization rates when full
feedback was available (MFull = 0.68 vs MPartial = 0.64;
χ 2 (1) = 10.98, p < .001), but the interaction with direction
of change was not significant, χ 2 (1) = 0.02, p = .88.
Participants maximized more in the first period of the
task (before the turning point; χ 2 (1) = 1400.49, p <
.001) and the interaction between direction of change and
period was significant, χ 2 (1) = 383.20, p < .001:
Maximization rates in the increasing condition were higher
than the decreasing condition before the turning point, but
significantly lower after the turning point, suggesting lower
levels of adaptation to change in the increasing condition,
irrespective of feedback availability (full or partial).
One would assume that the presence of full feedback
would allow for equal levels of adaptation in both directionof-change conditions. Any differences between the two
conditions would be found in the partial feedback group
and attributed to the information asymmetry caused by
the hot-stove effect (Denrell & March, 2001). The effect
suggests that early negative experiences have a prolonged
effect on choice, leading to fewer selections from the option
that generated these negative experiences (or outcomes). In
the case of the increasing condition with partial feedback,
participants would not experience the change in the relative
value of the risky option (i.e., the “hot-stove”, as it mostly
returns 0 at the initial stages of the task) because they would
under-explore this option in fear of receiving unfavourable
0 outcomes. However, with full feedback, the hot-stove
effect is no longer relevant as participants can observe the
outcomes of the “hot-stove” without experiencing them:
such (foregone) outcomes are not consequential, but provide
full information about the outcomes of a choice option. In
the increasing condition, early avoidance of the risky option
would be reversed by the presence of foregone outcomes,
causing participants to switch to the risky option as soon as
they realized the change in the probabilities of the dynamic
risky option (i.e., more frequent 500 outcomes from the
risky option after trial 50). However, this pattern is not
observed here; in fact, Fig. 1 shows that the maximization
rate in the increasing condition (for both types of feedback)
exceeded 50% only after trial 75; at the same time (trial
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75), the maximization rate in the decreasing condition was
already above 75%.
To examine the impact of any hot-stove effects on choice
adaptation, we focused on the significant 3-way interaction
(Direction × Feedback × Period). If the maximization
rates are similar in the two direction conditions with full
feedback, it would suggest that the direction effect is caused
by the hot-stove effect (that is, “stickiness” in the increasing
condition results from not realizing that the unselected
option becomes better across time). We found a significant
difference between increasing (M = 0.52) and decreasing
(M = 0.64; OR = 0.60, z = −5.11, p < .001) conditions
in the second period of the task, suggesting that the hot
stove effect is not the sole driver of differences in choice
adaptation. The same effect is also observed with partial
feedback (MIncreasing = 0.44 vs MDecreasing = 0.67; OR =
0.40, z = −7.67, p < .001). These results suggest that the
information asymmetry between partial and full feedback
cannot account for the direction of change effect in people’s
ability to detect and adapt to changes in the environment.
Taken together, the empirical results suggest that slower
choice adaptation in the increasing condition cannot be
solely attributed to hot-stove effects: in both partial and full
feedback groups, we observed that the direction in which the
change occurs has a direct effect on choice and adaptation.
In the following sections we attempt to shed more light
on the determinants of these effects by incorporating a)
participants’ perceptions of the change in the environment
via the funnel debriefing questionnaire, b) computational
modelling analyses), and c) data from a different study
that used a similar design but in which both options were
risky.

Questionnaire on the awareness of change
To explore participants’ explicit awareness of the change
in the probabilities, we classified participants as “aware”
(or “unaware”) of the change according to their responses
to the questionnaire (see Appendix for explanation of the
classification procedure). Fig. 2A shows the proportion
of aware participants in each condition. The decreasing
condition with partial feedback had the largest proportion
of participants aware of the change. Of those participants
classified as aware of the change, the vast majority correctly
identified the stage in which the safe option was better
than the risky option (Q3: Fig. 2B). Furthermore, aware
participants were very close at identifying the trial at which
the objective change occurred (i.e., trial 50) as shown in
Fig. 2C; there is an effect of the availability of full feedback,
suggesting that participants were able to realize the change
in the environment earlier (around trial 40) compared to
aware participants in the partial feedback group who located
the start of the change around trial 60.
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Fig. 2 A) Proportion of aware
participants across feedback
presentation (Partial and Full;
x-axis) and direction of change
(Increasing and Decreasing). B)
Proportion of aware participants
that correctly identified the
stage (beginning or end of the
task) in which the safe option
was better than the risky (Q3).
C) Mean trial estimate of change
(Q4). D) Maximization rates
across time periods (P1: trials
0-50 and P2: trials 51-100),
feedback presentation, direction
of change, and awareness
groups (aware and unaware)

Explicit awareness of change led to different choice
behavior as illustrated in Fig. 2D. The maximization rates
across conditions (separately for the two periods, P1 and
P2, of the task) were analyzed in a similar fashion as in
the main behavioral analysis presented above. Overall, we
found that aware participants maximized more than unaware
participants, χ 2 (1) = 61.26, p < .001, and the difference
increased in the second period as indicated by a significant
interaction, χ 2 (1) = 5.18, p = .02. This difference was
more pronounced in the increasing condition, as indicated
by a significant 3-way interaction, χ 2 (1) = 50.41, p <
.001. In other words, becoming aware of the change after
the turning point (P2) has a larger effect in the increasing
than the decreasing condition. We also found that the 3way interaction with feedback presentation × period ×
awareness of change was significant, χ 2 (1) = 8.78, p =
.003, but this is because of a rather large difference between
the Partial and Full feedback groups in the aware group
before the turning point (P1). Overall, these results suggest

that awareness of the changes in the environment leads to
advantageous performance in experience-based tasks (see
also Konstantinidis & Shanks, 2014; Maia & McClelland,
2004; Newell & Shanks, 2014).

Computational modelling and choice
adaptation
The literature discussed in the introduction suggests a
number of explanations for the observed behavioral results.
The “stickiness” effect may be an explanation for the slow
adaptation in the increasing condition. Initial experiences
impact later choices (Rakow & Miler, 2009; Avrahami et al.,
2016), as evidenced by the fact that participants in the
increasing condition mostly stayed with the safe option even
after the turning point. In contrast, faster adaptation in the
decreasing condition may be due to strong recency effects
(Avrahami et al., 2016), where most recent experiences

Memory & Cognition (2022) 50:864–881

help participants realize a decrease in the frequency of
the best outcome, which causes increased exploration and
selection of the safe option. The slight emergent preference
for the safe option in the static condition is consistent
with diminishing sensitivity and risk aversion in the gains
domain, which is consistent with a range of studies in
experience-based decision-making (e.g., Erev et al., 2008;
Ert & Yechiam, 2010; Konstantinidis et al., 2018).
Cognitive modeling that incorporates memory and learning/updating processes, can help explain the differences
in behavior between the two changing probability conditions, and provide a coherent descriptive account for the
behavioural results. For example, whether “good memory”
- remembering and tracking changes in past experiences is an essential component for adaptation; or perhaps just
remembering recent experiences can be beneficial for adaptation. Cognitive models of human memory and learning
via experience can provide insightful interpretations of the
observed behavioral results and a common and integrated
theoretical account of the mechanisms likely involved in
choice adaptation.
In the next sections, we will first introduce two well-known
computational modeling approaches: an Instance-Based
Learning model (IBL) and two Reinforcement Learning
models (RL). Second, we will use the individual best-fitting
parameters to help describe choice and adaptation in each
experimental condition. To anticipate our results, the present
modeling exercise suggests that memory, as an individual
trait, is essential for successful adaptation to changes in
the environment. In particular, we find robust evidence for
recency, a mechanism necessary for successful adaptation
to changes in the dynamic probability task, regardless of the
direction of change. We also present a model generalization
analysis using the IBL model. This analysis illustrates
the predicted adaptation behavior of individuals with high
and low recency parameters across different directions of
change (e.g., from increasing to decreasing and vice versa).
This exercise helps strengthen the conclusions drawn from
the model parameters analyses: recency is an individual
trait important for adaptation to changing environments, and
not a result of the direction of change in the environment.
Finally, we show that the results of the present modeling
analysis can replicate in a new dataset that uses a similar
choice paradigm as in the current study.

Instance-Based Learning model
The IBL model of binary choice has proved quite successful
at capturing choice behavior in both static and changing
environments (see Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; Lejarraga et al.,
2012; Lejarraga et al., 2014). One fundamental assumption
in IBL theory (Gonzalez et al., 2003) is that choice
occurs by activating memories about past experiences (e.g.,
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observed outcomes) associated with each option/decision.
The activation of memory is modulated by at least two
processes (i.e., free parameters in the model): memory
decay and noise associated with the retrieval of these
memories. The activation of outcome i in each option j
on trial t is illustrated in the following equation (for a full
version of the activation equation in ACT-R including other
memory processes, see Anderson & Lebiere, 1998):



1 − γj,i,t
=
σ
ln
(t − tp )−d (1)
+ ln
Aj,i,t
γj,i,t
tp ∈{1,...,t−1}

where d is a decay parameter, σ is a noise parameter, γj,i,t
is a random sample from a uniform distribution (between 0
and 1), and tp denotes all the previous trials that outcome
i was observed. Lower values of d indicate longer-lasting
past memories (higher values of d suggest strong recency
effects). Overall, the first part of the equation is associated
with noise in retrieval from memory, whereas the second
part is related to the exponential decay of past memories.
The activation of each instance in memory determines how
likely it is to be retrieved. The probability of retrieval of each
instance i is relative to the activations of other outcomes
observed from choosing option j :
eAi,t/τ
Pj,i,t =  A /τ
j,t
je

(2)

√
where τ is random noise defined as τ = σ 2. Finally, the
model chooses the option with the highest blended value V:
Vj,t =

n


Pi,t xi

(3)

i=1

where x is the value of the observed outcome i from
option j , P is the probability of retrieval of this outcome
as defined in Equation 2, and n is the number of unique
outcomes in option j . The IBL model accounts for the full
feedback condition by creating an additional instance A for
the outcome i produced by the unselected option j on trial
t (that is, each trial t is associated with two instances as
opposed to one instance in the partial feedback condition;
see also Gonzalez et al., 2011).

Reinforcement learning models
Similar to IBL, RL models assume that agents update
the value of each choice option based on the observed
reward from choosing it; this is instantiated by a learning
or updating rule, which keeps track of each option’s
expected value. The first RL model is a delta learning rule
(hereafter, DELTA), which has been extensively used in
experience-based decision-making tasks (e.g., Busemeyer
& Stout, 2002; Konstantinidis et al., 2014; Steingroever

Memory & Cognition (2022) 50:864–881

872

et al., 2014; Weiss-Cohen et al., 2016; Weiss-Cohen et al.,
2018; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005):
Ej,t = Ej,t−1 + δj,t φ(rj,t − Ej,t−1 )

(4)

According to this rule, the expected value (or expectancy E)
of an option j on trial t is the sum of the previous trial E and
the adjustment based on the prediction error, rj,t − Ej,t−1 ,
which is the difference between the reward received on trial
t, rj,t , and the expectancy up to trial t − 1. The adjustment
is governed by the updating parameter φ (ranged between
0 and 1); values close to 0 indicate small updating, better
memory, and weak recency effects. The delta rule only
updates the expectancy E of the chosen option, whereas the
values of the unchosen options remain unchanged until they
are selected; this is coded by the dummy parameter δ, which
takes a value of 1 if option j is chosen, and 0 otherwise.
As with the IBL model, we did not apply any modifications
to account for the presence of foregone payoffs; the model
updates the expectancies of both options as if they were both
received (for alternative specifications see e.g., Yechiam &
Busemeyer, 2005; Yechiam & Rakow, 2012).
The second RL model contains a decay learning rule
(hereafter, DECAY), in which the value of the chosen option
is updated, whereas the value of the unchosen options is
discounted based on the following decay rule (Erev & Roth,
1998; Speekenbrink & Konstantinidis, 2015; Yechiam &
Busemeyer, 2005):
Ej,t = dRL Ej,t−1 + δj,t rj,t

(5)

where 0 ≤ dRL ≤ 1 is the decay parameter: smaller values
indicate higher updating and strong recency effects (the
dummy variable δ has the same meaning as in Equation 4).
Choice in RL models was implemented by a softmax
choice rule with a single inverse-temperature parameter θ,
which defines the probability with which each option is
chosen on a given trial:
eθEj,t
P (C(t) = j ) = k
θEk,t
k=1 e

(6)

Model ﬁtting results
We estimated the IBL’s decay, and RL’s DELTA and
DECAY parameters by fitting the models to each individual
using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) procedures.
Unlike the RL models (DELTA and DECAY), the IBL
model used a deterministic choice rule and a stochastic
component in the activation function (γi,t in Equation 1)
which is problematic for fitting individual participants using
log-likelihood procedures. To overcome these difficulties,
we generated 1,000 predictions for each trial and participant
under each parameter set θ (a combination of d and σ ).
Thus, the probabilistic model prediction for each participant

and trial t was the average of these 1000 predictions (see
for a similar procedure, Lejarraga et al., 2014). We tested
all parameter combinations (grid search) for 0 < d < 5
and 0 < σ < 3 with 0.01 increments. For the RL models,
the fitting procedure was a combination of grid-search (100
different starting points for each set of parameters) and
Nelder-Mead simplex search methods.
Figure 3A shows model predictions for risky choices
and maximization rates for each direction of change and
feedback condition3 . These results suggest that all three
models fit the data well and closely track participants’
choices during 100 trials. All models reproduce the main
behavioral observations in the dynamic conditions: (1) slow
adaptation to the underlying probabilities and suboptimal
maximization in the increasing condition, regardless of
feedback (partial or full); (2) faster adaptation, probability
matching, and higher maximization in the decreasing
condition.
To explore whether successful adaptation to change
can be explained based on the memory and learning
mechanisms assumed in the models, we investigated the
distributions of individual model parameters. Figure 3B
shows the distributions (violin-plots) of model parameters
across direction of change and feedback conditions. The
figure also includes the Static condition as a comparison
group. A first inspection of the differences between
parameters provides explanations for the observed choice
patterns in the direction of change conditions.
Specifically, in the partial feedback conditions (first
row in Fig. 3), the IBL decay parameter d is higher in
the decreasing than the increasing and static conditions
(MdnDecreasing = 1.39, MdnIncreasing = 0.60, MdnStatic =
0.26; Kruskal-Wallis Test: H (2) = 36.03, p < .001),
which suggests that participants in the decreasing condition
relied more on recent information, resulting in higher
maximization in the second period of the task (after trial 50;
see Fig. 3A). There were no significant differences between
conditions regarding the IBL noise σ parameter, H (2) =
2.90, p = .23.
The RL learning/updating and decay parameters show
similar patterns: Higher values of the DELTA φ parameter
(MdnDecreasing = 0.30, MdnIncreasing = 0.22, MdnStatic =
0.06; H (2) = 18.24, p < .001) and smaller values
of the DECAY dRL parameter (MdnDecreasing = 0.70,
MdnIncreasing = 0.81, MdnStatic = 0.89; H (2) =
13.18, p = .001) in the decreasing condition. These results,
obtained independently from different models, suggest
higher memory updating, higher decay, better adaptation,
and less “stickiness” to the previously learned values of
each option in the decreasing condition. The learning/decay
3 The model predictions are generated based on simulating 1000 agents

from each participant’s best-fitting parameter values.
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Fig. 3 A) Average proportion of
risky choice (Risky) and
maximization rates
(Maximization) for human data
(Data: gray line) and the IBL
and RL models across trials and
experimental conditions
(colored lines). B) Distributions
(violin-plots) of the best fitting
noise σ and decay d (IBL), and
φ (DELTA) and dRL (DECAY)
parameters across experimental
conditions. Square points
represent median values
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parameters also suggest that participants show a greater
degree of “stickiness” to the previously good option in the
increasing condition (see also Rakow & Miler, 2009).
Similar patterns about differences between the changing
probability conditions are observed in the full-feedback
conditions (second row in Fig. 3): participants in the
decreasing condition were characterized by higher decay d
(MdnDecreasing = 0.96, MdnIncreasing = 0.71, MdnStatic =
0.24; H (2) = 23.25, p < .001), higher φ updating
(MdnDecreasing = 0.12, MdnIncreasing = 0.06, MdnStatic =
0.02; H (2) = 11.62, p = .003), and smaller dRL
(MdnDecreasing = 0.86, MdnIncreasing = 0.94, MdnStatic =
0.98; H (2) = 7.71, p = .02). We also observed that across
changing probability conditions all three updating/decay
parameters (d, φ, and dRL ) have higher values in the partialfeedback than in the full-feedback conditions. Similarly,
differences between changing probability conditions are
more pronounced in partial-feedback. Also, the parameter

Partial: d R L

values in the static condition for both partial and full
feedback provide further support for the close link
between recency and learning processes and adaptation to
change: as the choice environment in the static condition
stayed invariant during the course of the task, all three
updating/decay parameters (d, φ, and dRL ) showed reduced
memory updating or decay compared to the dynamic
conditions.

Memory and recency in adaptive and non-adaptive
participants
To analyze how the models explain adaptive behavior,
we categorized participants in those who were adapted
to change (“Adaptive”) and those who did not (“NonAdaptive”). This categorization was the result of a median
split on maximization performance in the last 30 trials of the
task (trials 71-100), which provides enough time to notice
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the objective change that happens at trial 50. The main
question is whether successful adaptation to change can be
explained based on memory and learning mechanisms in
dynamic environments, as assessed by the parameters of the
three models used here.
Figure 4 shows model parameter distributions separately
for Adaptive and Non-Adaptive participants across changing probability and feedback conditions. The pattern that
stands out is that all three learning/decay parameters (d,
φ, and dRL ) show distinct parameter profiles between the
two adaptation groups in both Partial and Full feedback,
indicating that successful adaptation to change and higher
maximizing rates are captured (in the models used here) by
higher decay (IBL and DECAY models) and higher learning
rates (DELTA model). This effect is suggestive of the ability of these models to discriminate between different choice
profiles and degrees of adaptation to change.

IBL model generalization
The analysis in this section aims to illustrate how
individuals characterized by high or low recency would
adapt to different conditions of direction of change (e.g.,
from increasing to decreasing conditions and vice versa).
This exercise helps explore whether model parameters can
only be considered in the decision environment in which
they have been calibrated/fitted, or whether they represent
unique psychological features of each individual (see related
discussion in Ballard et al., 2021; Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011;
Harman et al., 2021).
One issue of interest is whether individuals characterized by high recency in the decreasing condition would
maximize equally well in the increasing condition, compared to individuals with low recency. The expectation is
Adaptive

Non−Adaptive

Partial: σ
3
2

Parameter Value

that, if high recency is relevant to adaptation, then individuals with high recency would not only show high levels
of maximization in the decreasing but also in the increasing condition. Similarly, individuals with low recency in the
decreasing condition should be unable to reach high levels
of maximization in the increasing condition.
To explore this analysis, we used participants’ bestfitting IBL parameters from a specific decision environment
(i.e., calibration decision environment) to simulate choice
behavior in new experimental conditions (i.e., test decision
environment). This is similar to “the generalization criterion” discussed in the model comparison literature (Ahn
et al., 2008; Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). We split participants into two groups (median split; High recency and Low
recency) using their best fitting d parameter for each of
the dynamic conditions (Increasing and Decreasing) and for
each of the feedback groups (Partial and Full). This created 8 groups of combinations of decay d parameter, i.e.,
High Recency-Increasing; High Recency-Decreasing; Low
Recency-Increasing; and Low Recency-Decreasing, separately for the partial and full feedback groups. For each
calibration group, we sampled 1,000 random combinations
of best fitting parameters (pairs of d and σ IBL parameters)
and simulated behavior using the characteristics (payoffs
and probabilities) of the test environment.
The aggregate results of the simulation exercise are
presented in Fig. 5. The figure presents simulated behavior
in the test condition with parameters fitted (i.e., calibrated)
in the calibration condition: “Calibration Condition →
Test Condition”. The left panels of Fig. 5 (“Decreasing
→ Increasing”) show simulated behavior in the Increasing
condition, of participants calibrated in the Decreasing
condition and classified as high and low recency agents.
These results are presented together with the human
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Fig. 4 Distributions of model parameters (violin plots) for adaptive and non-adaptive participants across changing probability (Increasing;
Decreasing) and feedback presentation conditions (Partial and Full). Black square points represent median values

Memory & Cognition (2022) 50:864–881
Data

High Recency

Decreasing

Low Recency

Increasing

Increasing

Decreasing

1.00
0.75
Partial

0.50

Maximization

0.25
0.00

high d : 3.06

high d : 1.56

low d : 0.75

low d : 0.24

high d : 1.68

high d : 1.41

1.00
0.75
Full

Fig. 5 Generalization
simulations for partial and full
feedback groups using the best
fitting parameters from one
decision environment
(calibration environment) to
simulate behavior in the other
decision environment (test
environment): calibration set →
test set. Colored lines represent
high and low recency, which are
plotted against behavior in the
test set (black line). Each panel
shows the average high and low
IBL d parameter values, which
were estimated in the calibration
environment and used to
generate behavior in the test
environment

875

0.50
0.25
0.00

low d : 0.51
0

25

low d : 0.28
50

75

100 0

25

50

75

100

Trial

data observed in the Increasing condition. Similarly, the
right panels of Fig. 5 (“Increasing → Decreasing”)
show simulated behavior in the Decreasing condition, of
participants calibrated in the Increasing condition and
classified as high and low recency agents (along with
observed human data in the Decreasing condition). It is
important to note that the 8 groups of “High Recency”
and “Low Recency” are characterized by different average
recency (or IBL d) values; the average high and low d values
(high d and low d) used to simulate behavior are shown in
each of the four panels in Fig. 5.
It is easy to observe that regardless of the condition
in which they were calibrated, simulated agents with high
recency maximize more than those with low recency in the
second period of the task (trials 51-100). Agents with low
recency seem to maximize more with full feedback in the
first period of the task (trials 1-50), but they adapt to change
in the environment less successfully than agents with high
recency. These results suggest that recency is an individual
trait, and that individuals with high recency (those that
mostly rely on recent experiences) are able to adapt to
change better than those with low recency, regardless of the
direction of change4 .
4 The

IBL model predicts that agents with identical d and σ parameter
values will have similar levels of maximization and adaptation under
conditions of full feedback, regardless of the direction of change
(increasing or decreasing). The higher maximization rates in the full
feedback group of the decreasing condition (see Fig. 5–Full) are
explained by higher average d values than the increasing condition
(high d: 1.68 vs 1.41 and low d: 0.51 vs 0.28).

Choice adaptation and risk preferences
A potential moderating factor of how people adapt to change
is individual risk preferences and the composition of the
decision environment. Given that our experimental task
involved a safe and a risky option, a possible explanation
for the observed adaptation patterns in the two directions of
change conditions is participants’ willingness to take risks.
This is particularly relevant in the context of the present
study as the risk is experienced, and these experiences
may be unique for each participant. To determine whether
the effects of the direction of change and feedback on
adaptation are the result of risk preferences, we used the
data from McCormick et al. (2020), collected in a study
with an identical experimental design to the one reported
here, except that in their study a choice was made between
two risky options (as opposed to safe vs risky in our
study). Specifically, participants made a choice between two
risky options that returned the same two outcomes, 0 or
500 points. One option was stationary and returned these
outcomes with constant probabilities (p = 0.50 for each),
whereas the dynamic conditions (increasing and decreasing)
were identical to our study.
We looked at adaptation rates (i.e., maximization
behavior in Period 2) in the two task designs (Safe vs
Risky: SR and Risky vs Risky: RR) across direction of
change and feedback conditions (see Fig. 6). We analyzed
the data as previously with the addition of design as a fixedeffect. Overall, there was a 4-way significant Direction
× Feedback × Period × Design interaction, χ 2 (1) =
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57.07, p < .001. Following up on the interaction effect,
the main contrast of interest is the difference between
the direction of change conditions in the RR design.
Unlike what we observed in the SR design (i.e., significant
direction of change effects in both partial and full feedback
groups), in the RR design there are no differences between
increasing and decreasing conditions across both feedback
groups (both ps > 0.083). This largely suggests that
participants’ risk preferences and the composition of the
choice environment affect choice adaptation in dynamic
environments; in other words, the direction of change effect
that is present when a safe option is pitted against a risky
option seems to disappear when both options are risky.
Combining the results from both designs/studies allows
for a clearer interpretation of the observed behavioral
effects. First, the effect of the direction of change seems
to be immune to the availability of full feedback, but
disappears in a choice environment where both options
are risky (and provide identical outcomes). This can be
further explained by risk aversion in the gain domain,
which may have caused the higher maximization levels in
the decreasing condition, where the advantageous/adaptive
behavior is to select the safe option after the turning point.
On the other hand, in the increasing condition, overcoming
risk aversion and switching to the risky option possibly
requires substantially more evidence (i.e., more frequent
high outcomes from the risky option). This is possibly why
the effect of the direction of change disappears in the RR
design where participants have to choose between risky
options.

Despite the moderating effects of individual risk
preferences and the environment composition, the question
is whether adaptive participants in the RR design would
show distinct recency and updating profiles compared to
non-adaptive participants. As before, we examined the
distributions of model parameters across the three models
fitted to individual data in the RR dataset (McCormick
et al., 2020)5 . These results are shown in Fig. 7: There is
a clear difference in the IBL d parameter between adaptive
and non-adaptive individuals in both dynamic conditions
and feedback presentation conditions (Partial and Full). In
agreement with the results in Fig. 4, adaptive participants
are characterized by higher d, suggesting more reliance to
recent experiences and thus higher likelihood to observe
the change and adapt their choices accordingly. Similarly,
the RL parameters (φ and dRL ) show differences between
the two dynamic conditions: higher φ and smaller dRL
for adaptive than non-adaptive participants, apart from the
decreasing condition in the partial feedback condition.

Discussion
The main objective of the current work was to provide
a characterization of how individuals adapt to changing

5 The

same IBL and RL models were fitted using the same procedure
as the one outlined in the Model Fitting Methods section
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Fig. 7 Distributions of model parameters (violin plots) for adaptive and non-adaptive participants across changing probability (Increasing;
Decreasing) and feedback presentation conditions (Partial and Full) in Study 1 in McCormick et al., 2020. Black square points represent median
values

conditions when they make decisions under risk and
uncertainty. This work builds on recent attempts aimed
at understanding how people detect and adapt to change
when making decisions from experience (e.g., Avrahami
et al., 2016; Kareev et al., 2014; Speekenbrink &
Konstantinidis, 2015; Rakow & Miler, 2009; McCormick
et al., 2020). In addition to contributing new empirical
evidence regarding the conditions under which individuals
detect and successfully adapt (or not) to change, we
also provide potential explanations and descriptions of the
observed empirical effects using computational cognitive
models.

Adaptation to change: Behavioral effects
The behavioral effects of the current and related studies (see
McCormick et al., 2020) can be summarized as follows.
First, there are robust differential effects of the direction of
change in people’s ability to adapt to change: in the context
of our experiment, risk which becomes more rewarding
over time (increasing condition) is harder to detect (or
harder to accept), compared to risk that becomes less
rewarding over time (decreasing condition). This indicates
that adaptation to increasing positive outcomes may be
adversely affected by initial disappointments (frequent 0
outcomes) which become difficult to correct later. This is
consistent with Rakow & Miler’s (2009) observation that
people may react and adapt more quickly to negative than
to positive changes (see similar observations in Lejarraga
et al., 2014). In addition, participants’ choices in the
decreasing condition show a clear pattern of probability
matching behavior: monitoring and experiencing the change

in the risky option makes behavior match the change in
the probabilities. In addition, the results from the funnel
debriefing largely support the observed choice patterns and
conclusions: participants who expressed more awareness of
the change maximized more than those that were less aware
of the change.
Second, the critical direction of change effect cannot
be solely attributed to information asymmetry and hotstove effects. While our initial hypothesis suggested that
adaptation difficulties in the increasing condition may stem
from information asymmetries between partial and full
feedback (and as a result, the hot-stove effect causing
under-exploration of the risky option and reduced rates
of adaptation), the results showed that, even with full
feedback, choice adaptation in the increasing condition
lagged behind the decreasing condition. Foregone payoffs
helped participants in the increasing condition maximize
more compared to the partial feedback group, but this
increase did not reach the maximization and adaptation rates
in the decreasing condition.
The questionnaire results are also illuminating: while
the percentage of participants classified as aware of the
change is similar in both direction-of-change and feedback
conditions (Fig. 2A), and while these (aware) participants
accurately respond to the funnel debriefing questions
(Fig. 2B and C), this knowledge does not translate into
equal levels of adaptation in the second period of the task
for both increasing and decreasing conditions. Figure 2D
shows that aware participants in the decreasing condition
(for both types of feedback) maximize more than aware
participants in the increasing condition (circle markers).
Hence, the questionnaire results rule out the possibility that
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differences in adaptation can be attributed to difficulty or
inability to detect that something is changing in the task
(which is also supported by the pattern of results in the full
feedback condition).
The immunity of the direction-of-change effect to
feedback availability and the observation that this does not
result from participants being unaware of the change is
challenging to existing theories and empirical observations
in the DfE literature; future research should explore the
conditions under which the effect is observed and the factors
that moderate it.
One of these factors may be the composition of the
decision environment and individual risk preferences; the
data from a study which explored the same instantiation
of direction of change (positive linear and negative linear),
but with choices between two risky options (RR design;
as opposed to choices between one safe and one risky
option, SR design) revealed that the effect disappears
and differences in adaptation between increasing and
decreasing conditions are no longer credible. A potential
explanation is risk aversion: participants in the SR design
were willing to stay longer with the safe option regardless
of the higher expected returns from the risky option in
the second period of the task. Another possibility is that
both choice options produce identical outcomes (0 or
500) which potentially makes discriminating and choosing
between options harder than when options produce different
outcomes. Future research can investigate the validity of
this hypothesis and, more generally, the aspects of the
decision environment that are more predictive of successful
and faster adaptation in dynamic conditions. The fact that
the task/environment composition can alter or even reverse
observed empirical phenomena in experience-based risky
choice is not surprising; for example, it has been observed
that underweighting of rare events (see Barron & Erev,
2003; Hertwig et al., 2004) - a pivotal effect in DfE tasks may be hard to generalize to choices between two-outcome
gambles (see e.g., Glöckner et al., 2016).

Computational modelling and adaptation to change
The question we address with computational cognitive
models is whether a common psychological mechanism
can explain the observed choice patterns of adaptation.
To that end, we used two modeling approaches with a
long history in DfE and learning tasks, which also make
different assumptions about learning and choice behavior in
similar tasks: a cognitive memory-based model (IBL) and
two instantiations of RL models. All three models captured
choice behavior, replicating the behavioral observations
across two different data sets (see Figs. 3 and 7). One
robust explanation emerges from the interpretation of the
parameter distributions across experimental conditions and
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datasets: recency is directly associated to adaptation to
change. Higher decay in IBL and DECAY models and
higher learning rates in the DELTA model (and thus higher
reliance on recent experiences) explain why participants
were able to adapt and adjust their choices faster in the
decreasing than the increasing condition. On the other hand,
lower decay and updating rates (i.e., more reliance on
old experiences, or primacy) in the increasing condition
explain participants’ prolonged “stickiness” with the safe
option. These results highlight the importance of sensitivity
to recent events and how reliance on the most recent
history (and forgoing older experiences) can be successful at
adapting to change in dynamic environments. This recency
effect is robust across feedback conditions (partial and full
feedback).
Furthermore, we provide novel predictions of how
patterns observed with one set of parameters in one
environment can generalize into a new environment. The
predictions made by the IBL generalization exercise (see
Fig. 5) suggest a major conclusion: higher decay and
reliance on recent experiences is an essential component
for adaptation to change under uncertainty. High decay
individuals are able to adapt to the changes in both dynamic
conditions (increasing and decreasing) better than low decay
individuals. That is, our ability to forgo initial experiences
and rely only on more recent experiences results in better
adaptation to change; in addition, low decay explains the
stickiness to the initially good option and the inability
to adapt to the change after the turning point. Thus,
regardless of the direction of change, the individual ability
to efficiently and strategically “forget” (i.e., individuals
with high decay) is essential for adapting to changing
environments.

Limitations and new perspectives on detection
and adaptation to change
The study of dynamic experience-based decision-making
has many practical implications in real life and an extensive
investigation of how people perform in similar tasks will
prove beneficial. Compared to static experiential choice
environments, the area of detection and adaptation to
change in dynamic settings remains largely unexplored.
Our present work provides useful behavioral observations
regarding adaptation to change: One critical mechanism
that is responsible for successful adaptation is the ability to
ignore earlier experiences and focus on more recent ones.
We acknowledge, however, the limitations of this
initial investigation and the potential boundaries of the
explanations found in this research. First, change in the
decision environments can be manifested in many ways
(Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010; Gonzalez et al., 2003;
Gonzalez et al., 2017; McCormick et al., 2020). In this
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paper, we explored a particular set of monotonic linear
functions of change of the probabilities of the highest
outcome. Arguably, this is perhaps not the most common
form of change in the world. Indeed, many dynamic systems
are not linear and some show periodic changes (e.g.,
demand of beer in the summer increases while it decreases
in the winter Gonzalez et al., 2017; Cronin et al., 2009).
For example, one can expect that in periodic changes,
remembering early experiences can be advantageous to
adapt to the cyclic conditions of change. Future research in
DfE should explore different functional forms of change and
behavioral choice patterns - for example, it has been found
that linear functions similar to the ones employed in the
current work are easier to learn (e.g., DeLosh et al., 1997;
Schulz et al., 2018) and people have shown a bias towards
linear functions with positive slope (e.g., see Kalish et al.,
2007).
Similarly, it would be interesting to examine whether
people have explicit knowledge of how probability changes
across time. In the current work, we assessed the degree to
which participants realized that something was changing in
the environment, but future research could try to ascertain
whether specific instances of the generating function of
change can be recognized, and in turn how they can be used
to inform choice dynamics. Also, it is important to note that
the objective distinction between static and dynamic settings
in DfE tasks may not be perceived as such by participants.
For example, a large body of work has shown that even in
static tasks people behave as if the environment is dynamic
(see Navarro et al., 2016; Plonsky et al., 2015; Szollosi et al.,
2019). Thus, understanding participants’ perceptions of the
degree of change or volatility in the environment may offer
better insights and predictions about choice behavior.
Naturally, it would be important to explore how decision
models account for people’s integration of experiences
across various functional forms of change. Are the same
representations assumed in the IBL and RL models able
to account for behavior in different functional forms of
change? What are the limits of the human ability to detect
changing patterns and act accordingly? These are important
questions to address in future research.

Appendix: Funnel debrieﬁng questionnaire
Questions 1 and 2 (Q1 and Q2; see below) were designed
to assess whether participants in the changing probability
conditions realized that the environment was gradually
changing. Q1 asked participants to indicate which option
they thought was the best throughout the task (i.e., produced
the most points overall); they could also respond that neither
option was better than the other (if participants responded
“neither” they were presented with Q2b, otherwise they
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were presented with Q2a). Q2a asked participants whether
they thought that the option they picked in Q1 was the
best option at each point during the game. Participants
were classified as aware of the change if their response to
Q2a was negative or if their response to Q2b was positive.
Aware participants were subsequently presented with the
remaining questions (Q3 and Q4), which were designed to
probe additional features of their knowledge and detection
of change.
Questionnaire:
Q1:
Overall, which option do you think was the best (gave
you the most points on average)?
Possible answers: A, B, or Neither
Q2a (if A or B is selected in Q1):
Do you think option {option selected in Q1} was the best
option at each point during the game?
Possible answers: YES or NO
Q2b (if Neither is selected in Q1):
Do you think that at specific points in the game one option
was better than the other?
Possible answers: YES or NO
Q3 (only participants who responded in Q2a = NO, or in
Q2b = YES):
Do you think option A {the safe option} was better:
Possible answers: Towards the beginning of the game —
Towards the end of the game
Q4:
Below is a slider that represents the 100 trials of the game.
As best as you can, please indicate around which trial option
A became better (or worse) than option B.
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adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as
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